Destroying the Barriers Between Commercial and
Investment Banking: Should Congress Repeal the
Glass-Steagall Act? by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 3 Article 9
Summer 6-1-1988
Destroying the Barriers Between Commercial and
Investment Banking: Should Congress Repeal the
Glass-Steagall Act?
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Destroying the Barriers Between Commercial and Investment Banking: Should Congress Repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act?, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1115 (1988), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol45/iss3/9
DESTROYING THE BARRIERS BETWEEN
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: SHOULD
CONGRESS REPEAL THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT?
Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933 (Banking Act)' in response
to the numerous bank failures that occurred during the early stages of the
Depression. 2 Congress believed that the bank failures resulted from spec-
ulative bank activities caused by the close connection between commercial
and investment banking.3 In the section of the Banking Act commonly
1. Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
2. See 77 CONG. REc. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (stating that purpose
of Glass-Steagall Act was to protect safety of bank customers' deposits). Congress feared
that the substantial number of bank failures would cause the public to lose confidence in
the banking system. See S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933) (hereinafter 1933
Senate Report) (noting that 2290 banks failed in 1931 and 1456 banks failed in 1932).
Congress realized the importance of the public having confidence in the banking system.
See H.R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933) (noting that public was afraid to
deposit money in banks and that Congress believed that bank instability would continue
until public confidence in banking system returned). Congress realized, further, that the
banking system and the economy would fail if the public did not regain confidence in the
banking system. Id.
3. 1933 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6, 10; see 77 CONG. REc. 3907 (1033)
(statement of Rep. Koppleman) (stating that chief cause of depression and bank failures
was diversion of depositors' money into speculative securities markets). Congress attributed
the failure of the Bank of the United States, in particular, to the activities of the bank's
securities affiliates. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 116-17, 1017, 1068 (1931)
(hereinafter 1931 Hearings).
Congress found that securities firms affiliated with commercial banks had engaged in
underwriting activities and stock speculation and had maintained a market for the banks'
stocks with the banks' own funds. 1933 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 10; see 77 CONG.
REc. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall) (discussing activities of securities firms affiliated
with banks). Additionally, some banks extended excessive credit to the banks' customers to
enable the customers to purchase the securities the bank offered. See 75 CONG. REc. 9906
(1932) (statement of Sen. Walcott) (noting that excessive use of bank credit by bank customers
to engage in stock speculation was a major cause of banks' weakness). Banks also purchased
long-term speculative securities for the banks' own accounts, and, therefore, tied up large
amounts of the banks' capital. S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1932). Congress
believed that because of the banks involvement with and ownership of speculative stocks,
banks, particularly member banks of the Federal Reserve System, had aggravated the stock
market crash. 1933 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6, 8, 10. Accordingly, a primary purpose
of Congress in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act was to prevent commercial Abanks from
engaging in investment banking and, therefore, diverting the banks' capital into speculative
securities. 75 CONo. REc. 9984 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass); see 77 CONG. REc. 3835
(1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (stating that purpose of Glass-Steagall Act was to remove
commercial banks from investment activities).
The potential for conflicts of interest between commercial banking and investment
banking also concerned Congress. 75 CONG. REc. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley).
1115
1116 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1115
known as the Glass-Steagall Act,4 Congress attempted to separate com-
mercial banking activities from investment banking activities.5 Specifically,
Senator Bulkley noted that a banker that has no investment securities to sell depositors is
in a better position to offer disinterested advice and to consider the safety of the depositors'
money than a banker that advises a depositor on the advantages of an investment on which
the bank is to receive underwriting, distribution, or trading profits. Id. For example, a bank
that underwrote a failing securities offering may advise depositors to purchase the security.
Id. The depositors' purchases would save the offering, and the bank would make a
commission on the sale as well. Id. Congress also had evidence that a securities affiliate
might sell excessive holdings through the trust department of an affiliated bank. 1931
Hearings, supra, at 237. Some witnesses at the 1931 hearings opined that selling a securities
affiliate's holdings through the trust department would be self-dealing and, therefore, in
violation of the trustee's duty of loyalty. Id.
Congress also feared that because the bank and the securities affiliate are closely
associated in the public's mind, public confidence in the bank might decline if the affiliate
encountered financial difficulties. 1931 Hearings, supra, at 1058, 1063; see Investment Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971) (discussing legislative history of Glass-Steagall Act).
Congress believed that because public confidence is necessary to the solvency of a bank, the
bank may make unsound loans to the bank's securities affiliate to help the affiliate overcome
financial woes. 1931 Hearings, supra, at 1064. Congress also thought that if the bank's
securities affiliate had invested in a company's security, the bank might make credit easily
available to that company. Id.
4. See Clark & Saunders, Glass-Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks' Capital
Markets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 811 n.1 (1980) (noting that popular
name "Glass-Steagall" refers to original bills' sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and Congress-
man Henry Steagall).
5. See 1933 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that separating commercial
banks from securities affiliates would strengthen banking industry); 77 CONG. REc. 3385
(1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall) (stating that Congress intended Glass-Steagall Act to
separate commercial banking from investment banking).
The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that Congress intended to use
several measures to separate commercial banks from the securities industry. 1933 Senate
Report, supra note 2, at 9-13. Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act to control the use
of bank funds for brokers' loans, to restrain banks from making direct loans on securities,
and to prevent speculative market loans by banks. Id. at 9. Congress intended, further, to
separate national and member banks from affiliates and limit loans from parent institutions
to affiliates. Id. at 10. Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act as a mechanism to control
and oversee bank holding companies by giving the Federal Reserve Board the power to
grant permits allowing the holding company to vote bank stock that the holding company
owned. Id. Congress believed that the Glass-Steagall Act would strengthen the banking
system and, therefore, curb the number of bank insolvencies. Id. at 11. Congress also
intended to strengthen the Federal Reserve System to enable the Federal Reserve Board
better to oversee banking activities. Id. at 11-12. Additionally, Congress intended the
legislation to protect bank deposits and to restore public confidence in the banking system.
Id. at 12.
In interpreting the Glass-Steagall Act, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the congressional intent to separate commercial banking from investment banking. See Board
of Governprs of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (noting
express congressional intent to separate banks from affiliates engaged in securities activities);
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971) (stating that undisputed objective
behind Glass-Steagall Act was to prevent commercial banks from engaging in investment
banking). The Supreme Court also has noted that in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress
determined that risks are inherent when commercial banks engage in securities activities.
GLASS-STEA GALL ACT
Congress in the Glass-Steagall Act attempted to limit the securities activities
of commercial banks and the relationships that commercial banks may
establish with investment banks and securities firms by prohibiting banks
from underwriting securities and from affiliating with firms engaged in
securities activities. 6 During the 1980's, however, courts have upheld
banking regulators' liberal interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act that
have allowed banks to engage in securities activities.7 Some commentators
and members of Congress believe that the judicial and administrative
interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act indicate that the provisions of
the Glass-Steagall Act are no longer necessary to protect bank depositors
and the banking system. 8 Thus, members of Congress 'urrently are at-
tempting to repeal certain sections of the Glass-Steagall Act to abolish the
separation between the banking and the securities industries. 9
I. PROVISIONS OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The Glass-Steagall Act refers to five sections of the Banking Act of
1933.10 Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits national banks from
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971). Congress believed that these risks
outweighed the benefits of competition, convenience, or expertise from commercial banks
entering the investment banking industry. Id.
6. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Glass-
Steagall Act).
7. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (noting that banks may engage in
certain securities activities and affiliate with securities firms under some circumstances);
infra notes 24-97 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions that have upheld banking
regulators' rulings that have allowed banks to engage in securities activities and affiliate
with securities firms).
8. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of commen-
tators that support repeal of Glass-Steagall Act).
9. See 133 CONG. REc. S12,259 (daily ed. November 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (introducing Financial Modernization Act of 1987 that would repeal Glass-Steagall
Act's separation of commercial banking and investment banking); infra notes 140-48 and
accompanying text (discussing provisions of Financial Modernization Act of 1987).
10. See Hawke, The Glass Steagall Legacy: A Historical Perspective, 31 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REv. 255, 255-56 (discussing requirements and prohibitions of Glass-Steagall Act, history
of Glass-Steagall Act, and issues that have arisen under Glass-Steagall Act); see also infra
notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Glass-Steagall Act).
As originally enacted, the Glass-Steagall Act contained six provisions related to securities
activities and affiliations with securities firms by commercial banks. See Hawke, supra, at
256 (discussing history of Glass-Steagall Act). Section 19 of the original Glass-Steagall Act
prohibited, without a permit from the Federal Reserve Board, a bank holding company
from voting bank stock that the holding company owns. Banking Act of 1933, § 19(e)(1),
48 Stat. 162, 188 (repealed 1966) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1982)). To obtain the
permit, the holding company could not own or participate in the management of firms
principally engaged in the issuance of securities. Id. Section 5 applied the prohibitions of
section 19 to banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System (member banks). 12
U.S.C. § 337 (repealed 1966); see infra note 14 (discussing significance of member bank).
Congress repealed section 19 of the Glass-Steagall Act and the application of section
19 to member banks in 1966 because Congress believed that the sections were unnecessary
1988] 1117
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underwriting any public issue of securities or stock." Section 16 also
prohibits banks from purchasing stock for the banks' own account.'
2
Section 16, however, allows banks to purchase and sell securities solely
for the accounts of the banks' customers.' 3 Section 5 of the Glass-Steagall
Act applies the limitations of section 16 to state banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System (member banks).' 4 Sections 20 and 32 of
the Glass-Steagall Act prohibit affiliations between Federal Reserve mem-
ber banks and firms engaged principally in securities activities. 15 Section
21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits any person or firm engaged in
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from engaging in
the business of receiving customers' deposits.'
6
II. THE LIMITS OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
Courts have upheld banking regulators' interpretations of the Glass-
Steagall Act allowing banks to conduct various securities related services.
7
in light of section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 (BHC Act). See Act of
July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13(g), 80 Stat. 236, 243 (repealing § 19 of Glass-
Steagall Act); S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2385, 2396 (discussing Congress' reasoning in repealing § 19). Congress
questioned the usefulness of section 19 in view of the BHC Act. Id. Congress also believed
that repeal of section 19 of the Glass-Steagall Act would remove any confusion resulting
from two sets of laws that regulate the same subject but with different definitions of bank
holding company. Id. Section 4 of the BHC Act prohibits a bank holding company from
engaging in nonbank activities or from acquiring or retaining voting shares of a company
that is not a bank. See Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13(g), 80 Stat. 236, 243
(repealing § 19 of Glass-Steagall Act and § 5's application of § 19 of Glass-Steagall Act to
member banks); infra note 25 (discussing § 4 of BHC Act and exception to § 4 for activities
that are closely related to banking).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 24, (para. 7) (1982).
12. Id. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act permits national banks to purchase
investment securities if purchased solely for the banks' own accounts. Id. Section 16 defines
investment securities as marketable debt obligations, subject to further definitions and
regulations issued by the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. Banks may not purchase, however,
shares of the stock of any corporation. Id.
13. Id.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982). Banks that choose to become members of the Federal
Reserve System are under the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. Id. §§ 221, 248 (1982); see infra note 89 (noting that federal regulations divide
banks into three separate categories).
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 78 (1982). Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits
relationships between banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and firms
engaged principally in the public sale or distribution of securities. Id. § 377. Section 32
prohibits interlocking management and employee relationships between member banks and
firms primarily engaged in securities activities. Id. § 78; see Hawke, supra note 10, at 258,
263-64 (discussing terms "engaged principally" arld "primarily engaged" as used in Glass-
Steagall Act).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982). Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act states, however,
that the section does not prohibit member banks from engaging in activities explicitly
permitted under section 16. Id.; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing
activities prohibited by and permitted under § 16).
17. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (noting that courts have upheld
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First, subsidiaries of bank holding companies may offer discount stock
and bond brokerage services. 8 Second, bank holding companies may
provide, through nonbank subsidiaries, investment advice and brokerage
services to institutional customers. 9 Third, nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies may underwrite and deal in mortgage-backed securities
and consumer-receiver-related securities. 20 Fourth, banks may engage in
the private placement of commercial paper. 2' Fifth, state banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System may have subsidiary relation-
ships with securities firms.
22
banking regulators' interpretations of Glass-Steagall Act that allow banks to engage in
securities related activities and affiliate with firms that engage in securities activities); infra
notes 23-97 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions that have upheld banking
regulators' interpretations of Glass-Steagall Act that allow banks to engage in securities
activities and affiliate with securities firms).
18. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 207, 216-21 (1984) (Schwab) (holding that affiliation between bank holding company
and discount broker does not violate Glass-Steagall Act). The brokerage services consisted
of executing the purchase and sell orders for securities placed by the brokers' customers.
Schwab, 468 U.S. at 209 n.2; see infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Schwab decision).
19. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821
F.2d 810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Natfest) (holding that providing combined brokerage
services and investment advice to institutional customers, through a bank holding company
subsidiary, did not violate Glass-Steagall Act), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct 697 (1988). The
proposal in NatWest defined the term "institutional customers" as banks, insurance com-
panies, corporations, or employee benefit plans with assets greater than five million dollars
that regularly invest in types of securities to which investment advice is regularly given, or
as a person that, at the time of receiving brokerage services or investment advice, has a net
worth greater than five million dollars. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 811 n.3; see infra notes 44-
53 and accompanying text (discussing NatWest decision).
20. See Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1988) (Citicorp) (holding that § 20 of Glass-Steagall Act does not
prohibit bank holding companies' affiliates from underwriting and dealing in mortgage-
backed securities and consumer-receiver-related securities if revenues from underwriting do
not exceed 50 of gross revenues of subsidiary); see also infra notes 55-64 and accompanying
text (discussing Citicorp decision). Consumer-receiver-related sedurities (CRRs) are securities
that consist of debt obligations secured by or representing an interest in a diversified pool
of loans to or receivables from a consumer. [Current] FED. BANKING L. RaP. (CCH) §
87,021 (July 14, 1987). The collateral for most CRRs is automobile receivables. Id. Credit
card receivables, however, have secured some CRRs. Id. Mortgage-backed securities are
securities that consist of debt obligations secured by or representing an interest in residential
real estate. [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) § 86,957 (July 1, 1987). A pool of one
to four residential mortgages normally secures mortgage-backed securities. Id.
21. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bankers Trust II), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct 3328 (1987); see infra
notes 66-86 and accompanying text (discussing Bankers Trust 11 and noting that United
States Supreme Court previously has held that commercial paper constitutes a security for
purposes of Glass-Steagall Act).
22. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 815 F.2d 1540, 1546 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 143 (1987) (holding that affiliation between state-chartered,
nonmember banks and securities firms does not violate Glass-Steagall Act); infra notes 89-
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In Securities Industry Associa ion v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ( Schwab)23 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the acquisition by BankAmerica Corp. (BAC) of the Charles
Schwab Corp. (Schwab) would violate section 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. 24 BAC, a bank holding company, applied to the Federal Reserve
Board (Board) for permission to acquire Schwab.25 Schwab engaged in
retail discount brokerage through a wholly owned subsidiary, Charles
Schwab & Co. 26 At the Board ordered hearings before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) the Securities Industry Association (SIA) opposed BAC's
application. 27 Nevertheless, the ALJ recommended that the Board approve
BAC's acquisition of Schwab. 28 The Board, after review of the ALJ's
recommendation, authorized BAC's acquisition of Schwab. 29 The SIA
appealed the Board's approval of the acquisition to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 0 On appeal, the Second Circuit
held that the Board acted within its statutory authority by approving
BAC's acquisition of Schwab. 31 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed
the Board's order. 32 Subsequently, SIA appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
33
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Schwab noted that section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act barred BAC's acquisition if Schwab engaged principally
97 and accompanying text (discussing Investment Co. Inst. decision and noting that member
banks cannot maintain such affiliations); see also note 135 and accompanying text (noting
that Competitive Equality in Banking Act of 1987 placed moratorium on nonmember banks
affiliating with securities firms until March 1, 1988 by imposing §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-
Steagall Act on nonmember banks).
23. 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
24. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
207, 216-21 (1984) (Schwab). The Unites States Supreme Court in Schwab considered whether
the Federal Reserve Board (Board) had the authority under the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHC Act) to approve BankAmerica Corp. (BAC)'s acquisition of Schwab. Id. at 210-16.
Section 4 of the BHC Act prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring a nonbank
entity unless the BHC Act specifically exempts the acquisition. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982).
Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act allows bank holding companies to engage in nonbanking
activities that are "so closely related to banking ... as to represent a proper incident
thereto." Id. § 1843(c)(8). The Schwab Court determined that the Board properly applied
section 4(c)(8) to BAC's acquisition of Schwab and held that the Board had authority to
approve BAC's acquisition of Schwab. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 216.
25. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 209. The Supreme Court in Schwab noted that BAC operates







31. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d
92, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
32. Id.
33. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 209.
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in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of secu-
rities.3 4 The Court found that Schwab did not engage in any traditional
underwriting activities.3 5 The Court noted that .Schwab acted solely as an
agent for its customers.3 6 Thus, the Court reasoned that because Schwab
did not engage in underwriting or dealing in securities, the terms "issue,"
"flotation," "underwriting," and "distribution" did not apply to Schwab.
3 7
The Court interpreted the term "public sale" to refer to the activities
described by the terms "issue," "flotation," "underwriting," and "dis-
tribution and to exclude the retail brokerage activities of Schwab. "38 The
Court also noted that section 32 and section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act
contain identical language and that the Board's longstanding interpretation
of section 32 excluded the activities of Schwab.3 9 The Court held, therefore,
that section 20 did not prohibit a subsidiary of a bank holding company
from offering the brokerage services offered by Schwab .40 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court permitted affiliation between a bank holding company
and a brokerage firm that buys and sells securities for the brokerage firm's
customers without giving the customers investment advice. 4'
Although the Supreme Court in Schwab held that a bank holding
company may acquire a subsidiary engaged solely in providing brokerage
services, the Court did not address the question of whether a subsidiary
also could provide investment advice. 42 In Securities Industry Association
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( NatWest)43 the
34. Id. at 216. The Supreme Court in Schwab noted that section 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act deals with bank affiliates. Id. The Court noted, further, that subsidiaries of
bank holding companies are bank affiliates because of the bank holding company's ownership
of a bank. Id. Additionally, the Schwab Court noted that section 16 did not apply to BAC
because section 16 only applies to banks and does not apply to bank holding companies.
Id. at 218 n.20; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of § 16
of Glass-Steagall Act).
35. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 218.
36. Id. The Supreme Court in Schwab noted that an underwriter normally buys and
sells securities as a principal, and a broker executes orders for the purchase or sale of
securities as an agent for the broker's customers. Id. at 217-18.
37. Id. at 217. The Schwab Court stated that Schwab did not issue or float securities.
Id. The Court also reasoned that underwriting and distributing securities apply to functions
distinct from the functions of a securities broker. Id. The Court noted that most securities
firms act as underwriters and dealers, as well as brokers. Id. at 218 n.18. The Court
reasoned, however, that Schwab was different from most securities firms because Schwab
engaged solely in the brokerage business and did not underwrite or deal in securities. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 218-19. The Schwab Court noted that Congress enacted the sections for the
same purpose and that the sections are part of the same statute. Id.
40. Id. The Schwab Court reasoned that because the Board had interpreted the term
"public sale" as used in section 32 to exclude brokerage services, the Court should interpret
"public sale" in section 20 to exclude the brokerage services offered by Schwab. Id.
41. Id. at 221.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that Schwab Court only held
that § 20 of Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit bank affiliates from offering brokerage
services).
43. 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct 697 (1988).
19881
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United States District Court for tt e District of Columbia Circuit considered
whether section 20 of the Gla',s-Steagall Act prohibited a bank from
providing investment advice combined with brokerage services to institu-
tional customers through a subsidiary. 4 National Westminster Bank PLC
and its subsidiary NatWest Holdings, Inc. (collectively NatWest) applied
to the Board for permission to provide investment advice and brokerage
services to institutional customers through a subsidiary, County Services
Corporation (CSC). 45 The Board approved NatWest's application.4 6 Disa-
greeing with the Board's approval of the application, the SIA petitioned
the District of Columbia Circuit for review.
47
On review, the NatWest court noted that in Schwab the Supreme
Court had held that the offering of discount brokerage services by an
affiliate of a commercial bank did not violate section 20.48 The NatWest
court noted, further, that the Supreme Court has held that the independent
provision of investment advice by a bank did not violate section 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. 49 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Board and similarly
determined that in providing the combination of brokerage services and
investment advice, CSC would act as an agent for its customers and not
as a principal in buying and selling securities.-O The court also determined
that CSC would not offer securities to the public as an underwriter for
the securities issuer.5 ' The court reasoned, therefore, that CSC's activities
44. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d
810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct 697 (1988) (NatWest). The NatWest court
noted that section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits a bank from affiliating with firms
engaged in the public sale of securities. Id. The court reasoned, therefore, that the dispositive
issue was whether NatWest's combined offering of investment advice and brokerage services
would constitute a public sale. Id.
45. Id. at 811. The Nat West court noted that CSC would hold itself out as a corporate
entity separate and distinct from NatWest. Id. at 812.
46. Id. at 812. The Board in Nat West reasoned that the combination of investment
advice and brokerage services would not constitute a public sale of securities under sections
20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. The Board also determined that section 4(c)(8) of
the Bank Holding Company Act permitted NatWest's acquisition of CSC as a proper
incident to banking. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (allowing bank holding companies
to engage in activities that are proper incidents to banking). The Board concluded that
NatWest's ownership of CSC would not violate section 20 because the combination of
investment advice and brokerage services would not constitute a public sale. National
Westminster Bank PLC, 72 FED. REs. BULL. 584, 592 (1986).
47. Natwest, 821 F.2d at 812-13.
48. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 814.
51. Id. The NatWest court reasoned that by providing investment advice, NatWest
would not transform CSC's provision of brokerage services into a public sale. Id. The court
noted that providing investment advice may be an attribute of an underwriter. Id. Never-
theless, the court reasoned that advising does not necessarily imply underwriting. Id. The
court distinguished underwriting activities from the activities of NatWest because underwri-
ters either purchase as a principal securities from an issuer or act as the issuer's agent. Id.
The court noted that CSC would not engage in either activity. Id.; see supra note 50 and
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would not constitute a public sale as defined by the Schwab Court.5 2
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that NatWest's acquisition of CSC did
not violate the Glass-Steagall Act and denied SIA's petition for review.
5 3
While the Schwab and NatWest courts have upheld federal banking
regulators' decisions allowing bank holding companies to establish subsid-
iaries that offer brokerage services and investment advice, courts also have
decided that these subsidiaries may underwrite securities which banks may
not underwrite (bank ineligible securities).54 In Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( Citicorp)
55
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
whether section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits a nonbank subsidiary
of a bank holding company from underwriting and dealing in mortgage-
backed securities and consumer-receiver-related securities.5 6 The Board
approved the applications of seven bank holding companies to underwrite
and deal in mortgaged-backed securities and consumer-receivable-related
securities. 57 The Board required, however, that the revenue from under-
writing these securities must not exceed five percent of the subsidiaries'
gross revenue.58 Disagreeing with the Board's approval of the applications,
the SIA petitioned the Second Circuit for review of the Board's decision.
5 9
On review, the Second Circuit noted that section 20 prohibits banks
from establishing subsidiaries that engage principally in the underwriting
of bank ineligible securities.6 The court reasoned, however, that the
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that Congress did
not intend section 20 to prohibit bank subsidiaries from underwriting
accompanying text (noting that CSC, as principal, would not buy securities from issuer or
offer securities to customers as issuer's agent). The court noted, further, that CSC would
not have any financial incentive to advise a customer to purchase a particular company's
security. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817. CSC's commission related only to the number of shares
traded and not from trading a particular company's shares. Id.
52. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 814.
53. Id. at 811. The NatWest court noted that the hazards that exist when banks
affiliate with securities firms were unlikely to occur with CSC. Id. at 818; see supra note 3
(discussing legislative history of Glass-Steagall Act and noting that Congress intended Glass-
Steagall Act to prevent hazards from banks affiliating with securities firms).
54. See supra notes 24 & 42 and accompanying text (noting that courts have considered
whether bank holding companies may affiliate with firms that offer brokerage services or
establish subsidiaries that offer investment advice and brokerage services); infra notes 55-64
and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's consideration of whether subsidiary of
bank holding company may underwrite and deal in mortgage-backed securities and consumer-
receiver-related securities).
55. 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
56. Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d




60. Id. at 52; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of §
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securities that section 16 allowed banks to underwrite. 61 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the engaged principally test in section 20 applies
only to underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible securities and not to
all securities activities. 62 The court concluded, further, that the Board's
five percent limitation on gross revenue from underwriting bank ineligible
securities was a reasonable interpretation of the term "engaged princi-
pally". 63 The court held, therefore, that section 20 did not prohibit
subsidiaries of bank holding companies from underwriting bank ineligible
securities up to five percent of the subsidiaries' gross revenue.
64
In addition to deciding that subsidiaries of bank holding companies
may underwrite bank ineligible securities, courts also have decided that
certain activities directly engaged in by banks do not constitute the
securities activities prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. 6" In Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
( Bankers Trust 11)66 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit considered whether the private placement of com-
mercial paper by Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust), a member
bank, violated sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 67 The SIA
petitioned the Board for a ruling to determine whether Bankers Trust
violated sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act by engaging in the
private placement of commercial paper.68 The Board ruled that commercial
paper was not a security under the Glass-Steagall Act and thus determined
that Bankers Trust did not violate sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. 6
9
61. Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 52. The Citicorp court noted that section 16 of the Glass-
Steagall Act permits banks to underwrite and deal in certain governmental securities. Id.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 54. The Citicorp court noted that the Board had determined that the term
"engaged principally" denoted substantial activity. Id. The Citicorp court concluded that
the Board's determination that five percent of gross revenue constituted substantial activity
was reasonable. Id.
64. Id. at 55.
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that courts have considered
whether subsidiaries of bank holding companies may underwrite and deal in bank ineligible
securities); infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Circuit's consideration
of whether bank may engage in private placement of commercial paper).
66. 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3328 (1987).
67. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bankers Trust II), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3328 (1987). The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Bankers Trust 11 noted that in the
private placement of commercial paper Bankers Trust advises commercial paper issuers of
the interest rates and maturities that institutional investors will accept, solicits purchasers
for the paper, and places the issue of paper with the purchaser. Id. The D.C. Circuit noted,
further, that Bankers Trust receives a commission from the services, but that Bankers Trust
does not purchase or repurchase the paper for its own account or make or collateralize
loans with the paper that Bankers Trust places. Id.
68. Id. at 1055; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing provisions
of § 16); supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of § 21).
69. Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1055.
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In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ( Bankers Trust 1)70 the United States Supreme Court,
however, overruled the Board and held that commercial paper was within
the term "securities" under the Glass-Steagall Act. 7' The Court remanded
the case to the Board to resolve the issue of whether Bankers Trust's
placement of commercial paper constituted the underwriting prohibited by
section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act.72 On remand, the Board found that
Bankers Trust's placement constituted the selling solely for the account
of customers, an activity that section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act specif-
ically permits.7 3 In Bankers Trust II the SIA petitioned the United States
District Court for the District of D.C. for review of the Board's decision
on remand from Bankers Trust L 74 On review, the district court granted
SIA summary judgment holding that Bankers Trust's activities involved
the underwriting and distribution prohibited by section 21 of the Glass-
Steagall Act.7 5 Bankers Trust appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
76
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit determined that section 21 applied only
if section 16 prohibited the securities' activities. 77 The court rejected the
argument of the SIA that section 21's prohibition on selling or dealing in
securities applied to activities permitted by section 16.78 The court examined
the legislative history of section 21 and determined that Congress did not
intend section 21 to apply to activities permitted by section 16.79 Thus,
the court stated that if section 16 permitted Bankers Trust's activities, the
court did not have to determine whether section 21 prohibits the activities.8 0
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Glass-Steagall Act did not define the
term "underwriting" as used in section 16 and stated that the legislative
history of the Glass-Steagall Act did not clarify the term.8 ' The court
70. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
71. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137, 160 (1984) (Bankers Trust I).
72. Id. at 160 n.12. The United States Supreme Court in Bankers Trust I noted that
because the D.C. Circuit had concluded that commercial paper was not a security, the D.C.
Circuit had not considered whether Bankers Trust's activity constituted issuing, distributing,
or underwriting as prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. Thus the Bankers Trust I Court
expressed no opinion on that issue. Id.
73. Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1055.
74. Id.
75. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627
F.Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1986).
76. Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1055.
77. Id. at 1057. The Bankers Trust II court noted that section 21 logically cannot
prohibit what section 16 permits. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1057-58. The Bankers Trust II court noted that Congress amended section
21 to clarify the relationship between sections 16 and 21. Id. at 1055. The court reasoned
that the amendment implied that courts must read sections 16 and 21 together. Id.
80. Id. at 1057.
81. Id. at 1062.
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examined the contemporaneous securities legislation to determine the mean-
ing that Congress attached to the term "underwriting" in the Glass-
Steagall Act. 82 The court concluded that Congress intended the term
"underwriting" to apply to public offerings. 83 Additionally, the court
examined the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act to determine
whether Bankers Trust's private placement of commercial paper frustrated
the underlying purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act. 84 The court concluded
that private placement of commercial paper did not thwart Congress'
intent to eliminate risks in the banking industry. 8 Accordingly, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the Board's
decision that Banker's Trust private placement of commercial paper did
not constitute underwriting and thus did not violate the Glass-Steagall
Act.
86
Although the Supreme Court in Schwab and the Courts of Appeal in
NatWest, Citicorp, and Bankers Trust 11 considered the effect of the
Glass-Steagall Act on subsidiaries of member banks and the securities
activities of member banks, the courts did not address the issue of whether
the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited nonmember banks from establishing
subsidiaries that engage in securities activities.8 7 In Investment Company
Institute v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp8 the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered whether state-chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System may maintain sub-
sidiaries that engage in securities activities. 89 In Investment Company
82. See id. at 1062-64 (examining Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and noting that Supreme Court in Bankers Trust I had examined the definition of
"security" in contemporaneous legislation to determine meaning of term "security" in
Glass-Steagall Act).
83. Id. at 1064. The Bankers Trust II court concluded that the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 made clear that Congress understood the term
"underwriting" to mean a public offering. Id. The court concluded that the distinction
between public and private offerings was consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the
Glass-Steagall Act. Id. at 1066.
84. Id. at 1065-66.
85. Id. at 1066; see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of Glass-Steagall Act and noting intent of Congress in enacting Glass-Steagall Act).
86. Bankers Trust 11, 807 F.2d at 1055.
87. See supra notes 24, 42, 54 & 65 and accompanying text (noting that courts have
considered effect of Glass-Steagall Act on member banks); infra notes 89-97 and accom-
panying text (discussing D.C. Circuit's consideration of effect of Glass-Steagall Act on
nonmember banks).
88. 815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 143 (1987).
89. Investment Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 815 F.2d 1540, 1542 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct- 143 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in Investment Co. Inst. noted that federal regulations divide banks into three distinct
categories. Id. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System governs banks that
choose to become members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. National banks are within
the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation regulates insured state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System. Id.
GLASS-STEA GALL ACT
Institute the Investment Company Institute (ICI) filed a petition for review
of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulation that allowed
insured nonmember banks to maintain subsidiaries that engage in securities
activities. 90 The ICI also filed a suit seeking to enjoin the FDIC from
enforcing the regulation in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.9' The district court granted summary judgment against the
ICI.92 The D.C. Circuit considered the case both on appeal from the
district court's grant of summary judgment and on the original petition
for review.93 On review, the D.C. Circuit noted that only section 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act regulates nonmember banks.94 The court stated that
section 21 bars securities firms from receiving deposits, but does not
address whether nonmember banks may establish affiliations with firms
that engage in securities activities. 9 The court reasoned that to interpret
section 21 to prohibit nonmember banks from having affiliates engaged
in securities activities would be inconsistent with other sections of the
Glass-Steagall Act.96 Accordingly, the Investment Company Institute court
held that the FDIC regulation allowing nonmember banks to have affiliates
and subsidiaries engaged in securities activities did not violate section 21
of the Glass-Steagall Act.
97
III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE GLAS-STEAGALL ACT
A. Support for the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
Some commentators and members of Congress, noting the judicial
and administrative decisions that have allowed banks to engage in securities




94. Id. at 1547.
95. Id.
96. Id. In Investment Co. Inst. the ICI argued that section 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act, which allows banks to affiliate with firms doing limited securities work, is a special
exception to section 21 for member banks. Id. The ICI argued, further, that nonmember
banks cannot maintain any affiliate relationships with securities firms. Id. The D.C. Circuit
stated that because Congress did not intend section 21 to extend to activities of affiliates,
Congress did not indicate that section 20 was an exception to section 21. Id. at 1548. The
court reasoned, therefore, that under the ICI's argument member banks would be subject
to less stringent regulation than nonmember banks. Id. The court stated that because the
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that Congress was unsure whether
Congress had the power to regulate nonmember banks, the result under the ICI's argument
would be irrational. Id. The court rejected, therefore, the ICI's argument as unsupported
by the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id.
97. Id. at 1550; see infra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that Competitive
Equality in Banking Act of 1987 prohibited affiliations between nonmember banks and
securities firms until March 1, 1988 by imposing §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act on
nonmember banks).
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activities, have called for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.98 Some of
those in favor of repealing the Glass-Steagall Act also believe that the
Glass-Steagall Act was not essential to protect bank depositors and the
banking system.99 Additionally these commentators and members of Con-
gress believe that the Glass-Steagall Act is no longer necessary because of
the many changes that have occurred in the banking and securities indus-
tries since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. 00
Commentators argue that the Glass-Steagall Act does not add stability
to the banking system because of the numerous judicially and administra-
tively created exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act. 10 Commentators reason
that the activities permitted under the exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act
are as risky or riskier than the activities prohibited by the Glass-Steagall
Act. 102 Commentators note that, in addition to the various exceptions to
the Glass-Steagall Act, the Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit banks
from underwriting securities issued in foreign countries. 03 Representatives
of the banking industry argue, therefore, that because banks may make
loans to American corporations and underwrite and distribute these cor-
porations' bonds abroad, the prohibition by the Glass-Steagall Act on
underwriting and distributing bonds in the United States is illogical.'
°4
98. See, e.g., Friedman & Freisen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting
From Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413 (1984) (discussing need to alter regulatory scheme
of Glass-Steagall Act); Longstreth, Glass-Steagall: The Case For Repeal, 31 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 281 (1986) (arguing for repeal of Glass-Steagall Act); Note, Restrictions on Bank
Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 720 (1984) (arguing for lessening of restrictions on commercial banks to allow
banks to engage in wider array of securities activities through securities affiliates of bank
holding companies); 133 CoNG. REc. S16,659 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (introducing bill to repeal §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act); infra notes 99-
105 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of commentators that believe that Congress
should repeal Glass-Steagall Act); supra notes 23-97 and accompanying text (discussing court
decisions upholding banking regulators' interpretations of Glass-Steagall Act that allow
banks to engage in securities activities and affiliate with securities firms).
99. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of commen-
tators that believe that the Glass-Steagall Act was not the main factor in protecting bank
deposits and restoring stability to banking system).
100. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of commen-
tators who believe that because of growth and changes in banking and securities industries,
Glass-Steagall Act is no longer necessary).
101. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 284 (arguing that because of exceptions to Glass-
Steagall Act, no one can reasonably believe that Glass-Steagall Act adds stability to banking
system); Note, supra note 98, at 726 (noting inconsistencies and exceptions in separation of
commercial and investment banking and arguing that result is that statutory framework does
not protect bank soundness).
102. See Note, supra note 98, at 726 (reasoning that activities allowed under exceptions
to Glass-Steagall Act are as risky as underwriting corporate bonds).
103. See Note, supra note 98, at 726 (noting that banks may underwrite foreign
securities); see also supra notes 23-97 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that have
recognized exceptions to Glass-Steagall Act).
104. See Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
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These commentators conclude, therefore, that repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act would not subject the banking system to increased risks.
05
In addition to arguing that Congress should repeal the Glass-Steagall
Act in light of the exceptions to the Act and the inapplicability of the
Act to foreign securities, those in favor of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act believe that the Act's separation of commercial and investment banking
was not essential to restore financial stability and protect bank deposi-
tors. 0 6 Commentators believe that Congress has continued the separation
between commercial and investment banking found in the Glass-Steagall
Act because of the fear that banking and securities conglomerates would
dominate the business community and not because of the concern for the
safety and soundness of banks. 0 7 Commentators argue that the FDIC's
system of federally insured deposits serves to protect depositors and restore
financial stability. 0 8 Representatives of the banking industry also argue
that the Glass-Steagall Act serves only to protect the securities industry
from competition and not to protect the stability of the banking system. 0 9
Commentators argue that because the Glass-Steagall Act is no longer
necessary to ensure bank stability and safety and because of the numerous
exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress should repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act to reflect the changes that have occurred in the banking and
securities industry since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act." 0 Critics of
the Glass-Steagall Act note that rather than the traditional form of
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 140 (1987) (statement of
Thomas Johnson, President, Chemical Bank) (hereinafter 1987 Hearings) (noting that banks
may underwrite and distribute corporate bonds abroad and reasoning that Congress should
allow banks to underwrite and distribute corporate bonds in the United States).
105. See id. at 727-28 (arguing that repeal of Glass-Steagall Act to allow underwriting
would not subject banks to uncontrollable risks).
106. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 281-82 (reasoning that lack of public confidence
caused unsoundness of banking system and Glass-Steagall Act was not essential to restore
public confidence).
107. See id. at 283 (noting that Congress reaffirmed Glass-Steagall Act in passing Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 and subsequent amendments and reasoning that Congress
reaffirmed Glass-Steagall Act to prevent banking and securities conglomerates from emerg-
ing); One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1211, S.
1664, S. 3823, and S. 6778 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1970) (testimony of Charles E. Walker, UnderSecretary of the Treasury) (stating
that Congress did not need to enact legislation separating banking and securities industry
to protect safety or solvency of banks).
108. Longstreth, supra note 98, at 282; see 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982) (cieating Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) to insure bank deposits and regulate banks insured by
FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) (establishing fund to insure bank deposits up to $100,000).
109. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 103, at 140 (suggesting that securities industry is
not competitive because 10 securities firms control 60% of capital in securities industry and
over one half of pretax profits in industry).
110. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 287 (noting that traditional business of banks
has changed and that this change has weakened banks); 1987 Hearings, supra note 103, at
141 (reasoning that banking system should reflect current technology and reality of inter-
national competition and antiquated regulations harm consumers).
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borrowing through the short-term commercial loan, corporate borrowers
now obtain a securitized loan by issuing commercial paper.' Furthermore,
critics of the Glass-Steagall Act note that depositors whose deposits funded
the commercial loans now invest in money market funds and commercial
paper."12 Commentators believe, therefore, that the Glass-Steagall Act
prevents banks from remaining competitive as the business of lending
evolves." '3 Accordingly, commentators argue that Congress should repeal
the Glass-Steagall Act to ensure that commercial banks remain competitive
and viable.'
4
B. The Case for Retaining the Glass-Steagall Act
Those opposing the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act offer several
arguments that reject the contentions of those supporting the repeal."1
5
Those opposing the repeal do not believe that the existence of judicially
and administratively created exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act necessarily
leads to the conclusion that Congress should repeal the Act.",6 Supporters
of the Act argue, instead, that Congress should legislatively eliminate the
judicial and administrative exceptions." 7 Those opposed to the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act also reject the idea that the Act was unnecessary
to restore financial stability and protect bank depositors." ' Although
111. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 287 (noting that commercial paper now equals
one half of amount of commercial loans by banks); 1987 Hearings, supra note 104, at 141
(noting that issuing commercial paper is most efficient way for large firms to obtain short-
term funding).
112. Longstreth, supra note 98, at 287; see 1987 Hearings, supra note 104, at 141
(noting that mutual funds represent increasingly attractive way for consumers to invest
savings).
113. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 288 (noting that by preventing banks from
evolving, Glass-Steagall Act impairs banks' soundness); see also supra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text (noting changes that have occurred in banking industry).
114. Longstreth, supra note 98, at 288; see 1987 Hearings, supra note 104, at 141
(reasoning that Congress should repeal Glass-Steagall Act to ensure healthier earnings for
banking system based in United States, not abroad); see also supra notes 99-113 and
accompanying text (discussing reasoning of commentators that support repeal of Glass-
Steagall Act).
115. See infra notes 116-32 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of opponents
of repeal of Glass-Steagall Act and opponents' arguments rejecting reasoning of proponents
of repeal).
116. See Note, Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow
Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 99, 133 (arguing that judicial and
administrative interpretations of Glass-Steagall Act that have allowed banks to engage in
securities activities are impairing soundness of banking system).
117. See O'Brien, Financial Deregulation: The Securities Industry Perspective, 31 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 271, 278 (1986) (arguing that piecemeal dismantling of Glass-Steagall Act has
weakened securities industry); Note, supra note 116, at 135 (arguing that Congress should
reaffirm barriers of Glass-Steagall Act); supra notes 23-97 and accompanying text (discussing
court decisions upholding federal regulators' interpretations of Glass-Steagall Act that allow
banks to engage in securities activities).
118. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (reasoning that Glass-Steagall Act




federal banking regulators may prevent some of the inherent risks en-
countered by banks engaging in securities activities, the nature of the
securities industry prevents the elimination of all risks." 9 These commen-
tators argue that the separation between commercial and investment bank-
ing has reduced the risks inherent when commercial banks become involved
in securities activities. 20 Those opposed to repeal reason, therefore, that
Congress should not repeal the Glass-Steagall Act because of the increased
risks that occur when commercial banks enter the securities industry.'2'
Opponents argue, further, that the changes in financial technology do not
justify removing the barriers between commercial and investment bank-
ing.1"2 Opponents believe, instead, that the growth in technology allows
banks to abuse the combination of credit allocation by banks and capital
raising by securities firms. 123 Thus, opponents argue that Congress should
not repeal the Glass-Steagall Act because the abuses of the 1920's and
1930's could occur today if Congress permits banks to engage in securities
activities. 2
In addition to rejecting the arguments of those in favor of repealing
the Glass-Steagall Act, those opposed to repeal offer additional arguments
to support preservation of the Glass-Steagall Act. 125 Opponents of repeal
argue that the securities industry is already competitive and the entry by
banks will not increase competitiveness because the securities firms have
competed on price for several years.126 Additionally, commentators op-
posed to repeal reason that the acquisitions of firms in the securities
industry by companies such as Sears, Prudential, and Equitable indicate
that the ease of entry into the securities industry has prevented securities
119. See O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276 (reasoning that because of risky nature of
securities markets, banking regulators likely cannot prevent all risks that arise when com-
mercial banks enter investment banking).
120. See Note, supra note 116, at 133 (noting that history of period following enactment
of Glass-Steagall Act has shown that separating commercial banks from investment banking
has eliminated dangers and risks in banking that Congress intended Glass-Steagall Act to
eliminate).
121. See O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276 (arguing that securities abuses of 1920's could
occur today if Congress removes barriers between commercial banks and securities industry);
see also supra note 3 (discussing legislative history of Glass-Steagall Act and noting that
Congress believed that risks occur when commercial banks engage in investment banking).
122. O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276.
123. Id.
124. See id. (arguing that abuses of the 1920's could occur today if Congress allows
banks to engage in underwriting securities); Note, supra note 116, at 134 (reasoning that
Congress intended Glass-Steagall Act to ensure banking soundness in future as well as
correct abuses of 1920's and 1930's and that repeal of Glass-Steagall Act could endanger
banking system today).
125. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of opponents
of repeal of Glass-Steagall Act).
126. O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276. The Securities and Exchange Commission dereg-
ulated commission rates of securities firms in 1975 and, therefore, increased competition in
the securities industry. SEC Release No. 11,203 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) § 80,067 (Jan. 23, 1975).
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firms from eliminating competitiveness in the securities industry. 27 Op-
ponents of repeal also argue that the viability of securities firms should
be a policy concern when considering whether to allow banks to have
securities affiliates. 28 The opponents of repeal argue that large banks
could take the lead in the securities industry as the banks did in the 1920's
with similar devastating results. 29 Those opposed to repeal also argue that
because of current weaknesses in the banking system, Congress would be
unwise to allow banks to increase risks by entering the securities industry.
30
Finally, opponents argue that banks have been given special advantages
involving credit and federal insurance because of the banks' role as trustees
of depositors' funds.' Because of the special role of banks and the banks
credit advantages, opponents of repeal, therefore, contend that Congress
should not allow the banks to enter the securities industry.
3 2
C. Congressional Response
Because of the debate over whether Congress should repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act, Congress passed the Competitive Equality in Banking Act
of 1987 (1987 Act) to give Congress an opportunity to review banking
and financial laws and to make decisions on the need for financial
restructuring legislation. 3 a The 1987 Act placed a moratorium on certain
securities, insurance, and real estate activities by banks until March 1,
1988.34 The 1987 Act also required state-chartered, nonmember banks to
adhere to sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act until March 1,
1988.' a" The 1987 Act also stated that Congress intended to complete its
review of the banking system and make any decisions on restructuring the
system before the moratorium expired.
3 6
127. See O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276 (discussing competitiveness of securities
industry).
128. Note, supra note 116, at 133.
129. Id.
130. See O'Brien, supra note 117, at 274 (discussing weaknesses of banking system and
noting that banks today are in weakest condition since 1930's).
131. Id. at 276; see 133 CoNG. REc. S16,663 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Proxmire) (noting that Federal Reserve's discount to banks provides low cost funds to
borrowing bank and that bank's securities affiliates' use of low cost funds would disadvan-
tage securities firms not affiliated with bank).
132. O'Brien, supra note 117, at 276; seesupra note 131 and accompanying text (noting
that banks can borrow money at a discount from Federal Reserve and, therefore, banks'
securities affiliates can obtain money at lower cost than securities firms not affiliated with
banks).
133. Competitive Equality in Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86 § 203, 101 Stat.
552, 584 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (hereinafter 1987 Act).
134. Id. § 201, 101 Stat. at 581-83.
135. Id. § 103, 101 Stat. at 566; see supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (discussing
Investment Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. and the D.C. Circuit's holding that §§
20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act do not apply to state-chartered, nonmember banks).
136. 1987 Act, supra note 133, § 203. The 1987 Act also stated that Congress did not




After committee hearings on whether Congress should repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act and restructure the banking system,1 37 Senator Proxmire
introduced Senate Bill Number 1886 (S. 1886). 13 The Senate passed S:
1886 on March 30, 1988.39 If passed by the House of Representatives, S.
1886 would repeal sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 140 S. 1886
also contains several other provisions that affect the relationship between
the banking and securities industries.' 4 1 The repeal of sections 20 and 32
of the Glass-Steagall Act would permit banks to affiliate with securities
firms and, under certain circumstances, would allow banks and securities
firms to have common officers and directors. 42 S. 1886 requires that firms
that intend to engage in banking and securities activities affiliate through
a holding company structure.143 S. 1886 also prohibits a bank from lending
money to the bank's securities affiliates, to mutual funds that the bank
advises, to a company for the purpose of repaying securities underwritten
by the bank's securities affiliate, or to investors for the purpose of
purchasing securities underwritten by the bank's securities affiliate. 44 In
addition to permitting banks to affiliate with securities firms, S. 1886
permits banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. 45 S. 1886 also
allows banks that have no securities affiliates to issue mutual fund shares
137. 1987 Hearings, supra note 104; New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Com-
panies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Status of United States Financial System: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
138. See 133 CONG. REc. S16,659-668 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (introducing S. 1886 and discussing major provisions of bill); infra notes 140-48
and accompanying text (noting major provisions of S. 1886 that affect separation between
commercial and investment banking); infra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that
Senate passed S. 1886 on March 30, 1988). An amendment to S. 1886 passed by the Senate
renamed the bill the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988. 134 CONG. REc. S3424
(daily ed. March 30, 1988).
139. 134 CONG. REc. S3437 (daily ed. March 30, 1988).
140. S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 134 CONG. REc. S3360 (daily ed. March
30, 1988).
141. See 133 CONG. REc. S16,659-668 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (introducing S. 1886 and discussing major provisions of bill); infra notes 142-48
and accompanying text (noting major provisions of S. 1886 that affect banking and securities
industries).
142. See 133 CONG. RiEc. S16,652 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Senator
Proxmire) (stating that because of repeal of §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act, banks could
affiliate with securities firms); supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting provisions of
§§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act).
143. See S. 1886 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102, 134 CONG REc. S3360 (daily ed. March
30, 1988) (requiring that banks affiliate with securities firms only through bank holding
company structure).
144. See id. (amending § 4(c) of Bank Holding Company Act to regulate the funding
of securities affiliates by prohibiting loans between bank and affiliated securities firm);
supra note 24 (discussing § 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act).
145. See S. 1886, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 108, 134 CONG. REc. S3363 (daily ed. March
30, 1988) (authorizing commercial banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds).
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and sponsor unit investment trusts. 46 S. 1886, however, prohibits mergers
between bank holding companies whose assets exceeded thirty billion
dollars and securities firins with assets in excess of fifteen billion dollars.
47
The limitation on mergers prohibits mergers between the fifteen largest
banks and the fifteen largest securities firms. 1
48
IV. Should Congress Repeal the Glass-Steagall Act?
The provisions of S. 1886 provide a mechanism to eliminate the Glass-
Steagall Act's separation of commercial and investment banking. 49 Spon-
sors of S. 1886 correctly recognize that the separation between commercial
banking and the securities industry is no longer necessary to protect the
stability of the banking system and bank depositors. 50 By repealing sections
32 and 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, S. 1886 allows banks to affiliate with
securities firms, but retains the prohibition against banks' directly dealing
in or underwriting securities.' 5' S. 1886 thus protects the safety of a bank
by requiring a separate capitalization of a securities affiliate. 52 The pro-
hibition in S. 1886 against loans from a bank to a securities affiliate will
protect the federal deposit insurance program and ensure the safety of
bank deposits. 53 The provision in S. 1886 prohibiting a loan from a bank
to the bank's securities affiliate also alleviates Congress' fear that a bank
would loan money to a financially weak securities affiliate to maintain
public confidence.5
146. Id.
147. See id. § 102, 134 CONG. REc. S3360 (daily ed. March 30, 1988) (regulating
concentration of resources between banks and securities firms).
148. 133 CoNG. REc. S16,663 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Proxmire);
see supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that Congress reaffirmed Glass-Steagall
Act because Congress feared that conglomerates of banking and securities firms would
dominate business community).
149. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of S. 1886).
S. 1886 also addresses the concerns of those opposed to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of those opposed
to repeal of Glass-Steagall Act); infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text (analyzing
provisions of S. 1886).
150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that creation of FDIC rather
than enactment of Glass-Steagall Act protected bank depositors and ensured stability of
banking system).
151. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (noting that §§ 5 and 16 of Glass-
Steagall Act prohibit banks from underwriting or dealing in securities). S. 1886 would repeal
only sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101
(1987).
152. See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102, 134 CONG. REc. 53360 (daily ed. March
30, 1988) (requiring that bank holding company capitalize securities affiliate separately from
bank holding company's banking subsidiary).
153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that S. 1886 prohibits loans
from bank to bank's securities affiliate); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative history of Glass-Steagall Act and noting that Congress feared that
banks would make unsound loans to securities affiliates).
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that S. 1886 prohibits loans
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In addition to recognizing that the Glass-Steagall Act does not serve
to protect the safety of the banking system and of depositors' funds,
sponsors of S. 1886 also correctly recognize that the Glass-Steagall Act's
separation of commercial and investment banking is unnecessary in view
of the exceptions to the Act. 55 Because banks can underwrite the bonds
of United States corporations abroad, banks should be able to underwrite
these bonds in the United States.15 6 A bank would incur no greater risk
from underwriting activities in the United States than from underwriting
activities abroad.
57
While S. 1886 does not increase the risk of bank depositors, S. 1886
does ensure that banks will not have a competitive edge in competing with
securities firms.'58 Because S. 1886 prohibits banks from making loans to
securities affiliates, banks cannot use funds borrowed from the Federal
Reserve System at a discount to loan money to securities affiliates at a
discount and, therefore, give the affiliate an advantage over securities
firms not affiliated with a bank. 59 Furthermore, S. 1886 eliminates the
anti-competitive effects of the Glass-Steagall Act. 60 The increased com-
petition between banks and securities firms in the area of municipal bonds
will be especially beneficial to consumers. 161 By allowing banks to under-
write municipal bonds, S. 1886 will cause competition to reduce under-
from banks to securities affiliates); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Glass-Steagall Act and noting that Congress feared that bank may
make unsound loans to financially unsound securities affiliate to maintain public confidence
in bank).
155. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (reasoning that because of the
numerous exceptions to Glass-Steagall Act, Congress should repeal Glass-Steagall Act); see
also supra notes 23-97 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions upholding admin-
istratively created exceptions to Glass-Steagall Act).
156. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that banks may underwrite in
foreign countries bonds issued by United States corporations).
157. See Longstreth, supra note 98, at 285 (stating that underwriting bonds in United
States is no riskier than underwriting bonds abroad or than other activities permitted by
exceptions to Glass-Steagall Act).
158. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress should not
repeal Glass-Steagall Act because of special credit advantages of banks); infra note 159 and
accompanying text (noting that banks cannot use funds borrowed at discount to loan funds
to securities affiliates).
159. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that S. 1886 prohibits banks
from making loans to banks' own securities affiliates); 133 CONG. REc. S16,663 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (reasoning that Federal Reserve's discount to
banks provides low cost funds to borrowing banks and that securities affiliate's use of funds
borrowed at a discount would disadvantage securities firms not affiliated with banks).
160. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (reasoning that Glass-Steagall Act has
insulated securities industry from competition); infra note 161 and accompanying text
(reasoning that increased competition will benefit consumers).
161. See 133 CONG. REc. S16,661 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
(noting that during first six months of 1987, 10 largest securities firms underwrote 67% of
municipal bonds issued); infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (noting that allowing
banks to underwrite municipal bonds will benefit consumers).
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writing fees.1 62 Consumers will benefit from these reductions because
consumers ultimately service the municipal debt represented by the bonds. 63
Additionally, S. 1886's prohibition against mergers between the fifteen
largest securities firms and the fifteen largest banks will prevent the
establishment of banking and securities conglomerates.'6 S. 1886, there-
fore, encourages competition without risking monopolization. 65
In addition to ensuring bank safety and promoting competition in the
securities industry, S. 1886's repeal of sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-
Steagall Act allows banks to remain viable in light of changing technology
in the financial community. 66 Because borrowers increasingly raise capital
through securitized debt rather than commercial loans, banks have lost
much of the banks' traditional business.167 By allowing banks to participate
in the market for securitized debt through subsidiary affiliates, banks
should become more sound rather than less sound.
68
V. Conclusion
Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act to protect bank depositors
and stabilize the banking system. 69 Courts interpreting the Glass-Steagall
Act have noted that the major concern of Congress was to prevent hazards
that occur when banks underwrite and deal in securities or affiliate with
investment banks and securities firms.1 70 S. 1886 does not repeal the
162. 133 CONG. REc. S16,661 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (Statement of Sen. Proxmire).
163. Id.
164. Id. Some commentators believe that fear of the establishment of banking and
securities conglomerates led Congress to reaffirm the Glass-Steagall Act. See supra note 107
and accompanying text (noting that Congress reaffirmed Glass-Steagall Act out of fear that
banking and securities conglomerates would dominate American business).
165. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (reasoning that S. 1886 promotes
competition in securities industry without promoting creation of banking and securities
monopolies).
166. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (reasoning that repeal of Glass-
Steagall Act will allow banks to remain competitive in face of changing technology in
banking and securities industries).
167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting that commercial paper has
replaced short-term commercial lending).
168. See supra note 113-14 and accompanying text (noting that by allowing banks to
remain competitive and produce healthier earnings for banks, repeal of Glass-Steagall Act
will ensure safety and stability of banking system).
169. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended Glass-
Steagall Act to protect safety of bank customers' deposits and to add stability to banking
system); supra notes 3 & 5 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Glass-
Steagall Act and noting that Congress believed that separating commercial banking from
investment banking would protect depositors and stabilize banking system).
170. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) (stating that Congress
intended to prevent hazards that arise when commercial banks engage in securities activities);
Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 219-
20 (1984) (Schwab) (noting that Congress believed that involvement of banks in underwriting




prohibition against banks' underwriting and dealing in securities.' 7 ' S.
1886, however, does allow banks to affiliate with investment banks and
securities firms. 72 Because S. 1886 requires that commercial banks affiliate
with investment banks and securities firms through a carefully regulated
holding company structure, S. 1886 protects the stability of the banking
system. 7  Because S. 1886 removes the separation between commercial
and investment banks without jeopardizing the safety of the banking
system, the House of Representatives should follow the lead of the Senate
and enact S. 1886 and repeal sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. '74
KEVIN J. HENDERSON
171. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that S. 1886 does not repeal
§§ 5 and 16 of Glass-Steagall Act and, therefore, does not allow banks to underwrite or
deal in securities); see also supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (noting provisions of
§§ 5 and 16).
172. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of S. 1886 and
noting that repeal of §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act by S. 1886 allows banks to affiliate
with securities firms).
173. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of S. 1886 and
noting that S. 1886 requires banks to affiliate with securities firms through holding company
structure); supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that S. 1886 prohibits loans from
bank to securities affiliate).
174. See supra notes 106-09 & 155-57 and accompanying text (noting that commentators
reason that separation between commercial and investment banking is no longer essential to
stabilize banking system); supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (reasoning that S. 1886
protects safety of bank depositors and stability of banking system); supra notes 158-68 and
accompanying text (reasoning that S. 1886 promotes competition in securities industry and
allows banks to remain viable in financial industry).
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